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Abstract 
This article introduces the role of labor demand of the elderly in the analysis of retirement decisions. We integrate both 
human capital formation and up-dating costs on older workers' job and explore how Social Security system affects 
human capital investment and retirement decisions. We show that, from the worker''s point of view, human capital 
investment and retirement age decisions are interdependent and positively related. On the one hand, an actuarially 
unfair pay-as-you-go system imposes a tax on postponed retirement which encourages early retirement, thus reducing 
incentives to invest in human capital. On the other hand, the pension system imposes a tax on training intensity. As a 
result, workers have less incentives to continue working. From the firm''s point of view, this implies an indirect tax on 
labor demand due to the decrease in older workers'' productivity. We then examine the pattern of the optimal policies 
according to flexibility versus rigidity of wages.
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     1. Introduction
Over the last decade, the trend of early retirement has been a widely debated issue, given
that people are living longer and staying healthier at all ages. Several studies suggested that
individual decisions are strongly a￿ected by the Social Security system (Gruber and Wise
(1998)]). The design of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system reveals the presence of a tax on
continued activity beyond the normal retirement age. A general consequence of this literature
is to advocate pension reform introducing incentives to continue working as a key policy
measure to increase the e￿ective retirement age (see e.g. Hairault, Langot and Sopraseuth
(2008a) or (2008b)).
In opposition to available results (see e.g. Desmet and Pestieau (2003)), the purpose of this
paper is to analyze the choice of retirement age when this decision is not a mutual agreement
between the employer and the employee. Our approach shows that the ￿rm’s employment
decisions play a key role in the early retirement phenomenon1. A second ambition of this
paper is to analyze the interactions between Social Security schemes and private choices on
both human capital investment and the up-dating cost on older workers’ jobs. By introducing
the possibility of updating, we allow ￿rms to increase their expected pro￿ts by incorporating
new technologies : the ￿rm may decide to pay a renovation cost to update the technology and
continue producing with the same worker. This renovation cost stands for the sum of both
the costs of new equipment and the costs of training. We then argue that a low retirement
age introduces a horizon beyond which ￿rms have less incentives to update jobs occupied
by old workers2. We ￿nd that, from the worker’s point of view, human capital investment
and retirement age decisions are interdependent, and thus, that an actuarially unfair Social
Security system negatively a￿ects the worker’s choices of training intensity and retirement
age with a "cumulative" e￿ect. Then, from the ￿rm’s point of view, we show that the Social
Social system implies an indirect tax on labor demand because of the decrease of the worker’s
productivity, implying a higher up-dating cost of the older workers’ jobs.
We also examine the pattern of policies aiming at restoring human capital investment
and retirement age to their e￿cient levels. There are two key questions considered in this
paper : Starting from an actuarially unfair PAYG system, what is the impact of old-age
policies on the retirement age and human capital formation decisions? And second, what
are the actual e￿ects of these policies subject to the degree of wage adjustment? It is found
that, while pension incentives and subsidy of up-dating costs are substitutable and allow to
delay the retirement age with an increase of older workers’ productivity if wage is ￿exible,
wage rigidity can imply that only a fraction of the tax distortions imposed by the PAYG
should be eliminated if the retirement age is imposed by the ￿rm.
1It is important here to note that our model di￿ers from other models where the retirement decision is
based on the implicit contract model ￿ la Lazear (1979). In this last type of model, ￿rms and workers agree
on a contract that pays younger workers below and older workers above their marginal product, allowing
to prevent shirking behaviors. Because older workers’ wages are higher than their productivities and their
reservation wages, it is necessary to introduce a mandatory retirement age, implying involuntary separation
form the worker’s point of view.
2See Langot and Moreno-Galbis (2008) for an analysis of the optimal up-dating time when there are labor
market frictions.
12. The Model
We consider a simple two period life-cycle model. Time is discrete and indexed by t=1,2.
The length of each period is normalized to unity. Moreover, the economy is populated by
two types of risk-neutral agents, namely, workers and ￿rms. The young worker is charac-
terized by a level of initial ability, h1, which is perfectly observable. The ￿rst period is
fully active. However the second is endogenously divided into a working period of length
equal to a fraction z · 1 of that period and a retirement period. The variable z can also
be interpreted as the retirement age. Thus, total active life lasts 1+z and retirement life 1¡z.
2.1 Worker’s Behavior
In the ￿rst period, a young worker with productivity h1 supplies a unit of labor, contributes
at rate ¿ to the PAYG system and consumes his total net labor income3 : c1 = (1¡¿)!h1¡T.
where ! is the wage rate per unity of human capital and T a non-distortionary tax. Further-
more, the young employee decides about his human capital investment in order to maximize
his working-life income. Human capital formation requires e￿ort. We denote the training
intensity by e. Disutility from education e￿ort is measured by the following training cost
function : Á(e) = e2
2 . We assume that there is no depreciation of knowledge, the level of
worker’s productivity in period 2, denoted by h2, veri￿es : h2 = (1 + e)h1.
In the second period, the old worker earns a labor income (1¡¿)wh2 during his working
period, where w is the wage rate per unity of human capital, and a pension p during his
retirement period. The pension level is assumed to be independent of the retirement age4.
Then, the total second period consumption is : c2 = z(1¡¿)wh2¡T +(1¡z)p. Furthermore,
in line with Cremer and Pestieau (2003), we assume that there is a disutility of labor denoted
by Ã(z), which increases with the retirement age : Ã(z) =
°z2
2 . where ° > 0 captures the
intensity of preferences for early retirement. Let ¯ denote the discount factor. Finally, lifetime
utility, which is assumed to be additive and separable, is given by :
u(c1;c2;z) = u(c1 ¡ Á(e)) + ¯u(c2 ¡ Ã(z)) (1)
2.2 Firm’s Behavior
Each ￿rm is reduced to one job. We assume that the only factor of production is labor. The
total output of a job ￿lled by a worker of age t and productivity ht is simply equal to :
yht, where y denotes the units of output per unit of human capital, and the ￿rm earns a
pro￿t denoted by ¦t. In the ￿rst period, we have : ¦1 = (y ¡!)h1. Furthermore, we assume
that during the second period, production requires additional costs : speci￿c organization
of the job must be up-dated in order to maintain its productivity. We assume that these
up-dating costs increase with the duration of production : '(z) =
fz2
2 , where f > 0 can be
viewed as a ￿xed cost per an additional period. Then, the second period pro￿t writes as :
3We assume that agents do not have access to ￿nancial assets.
4This assumption is counterfactual in many countries. A more general approach would be to assume that
the overall bene￿ts increase, but not in actuarially fair way, with the retirement age. This approach would
make the analysis more di￿cult without bringing more insights to our results.
2¦2 = z(y ¡ w)h2 ¡ '(z), and the total discounted pro￿t as :
¦(z;'(z)) = ¦1 + ¯¦2(z;'(z)) (2)
3. Partial Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 The Worker’s Decisions
The household chooses the intensity of human capital investment and the retirement age
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These equations show that the initial level of human capital positively a￿ects the indivi-
dual decisions : high-skilled worker will work longer with high productivity in the second
period. More importantly, human capital investment and retirement age decisions are in-
terdependent. Indeed, equations (4) and (5) allow us to spell out various complementarities
over the life-cycle. The ￿rst complementarity is that the more an individual works, the larger
will be the returns to his human capital investment. And, the more an individual learns, the
larger are the incentives to work, as wages are higher. The second complementarity is that
the later an individual retires, the larger will be the returns to his human capital investments.
And, the more an individual learns, the more costly early retirement will be.
We now introduce the PAYG system with constant bene￿ts. In this case, the training
intensity and the retirement age are respectively given by the following expressions :












These conditions suggest that the training intensity and the retirement age are reduced com-
pared to the laissez-faire setting. First, for a given retirement age, because the contributions
to the social security at the rate ¿ reduce the marginal bene￿t of an increase in the training
intensity in terms of labor income, the accumulation of human capital decreases. Second,
equation (7) shows that, for a given training intensity, an increase in z implies a tax, in terms
of extra pension contributions and forgone pension payments : ¸(¿;p) = ¿+
p
[1+e(¿;p)]wh1, which
is known in the literature as the tax on postponed activity (TPA). It is important to note
here that, as human capital investment and retirement age decisions are interdependent,
these two negative e￿ects also interact. The PAYG system impose negative "cumulative"
e￿ects on the worker’s decisions :
3- First, if the tax on continued activity increases, the retirement age decreases. In res-
ponse, because the horizon of older workers is shorter, workers invest less in human
capital accumulation.
- Second, if the tax on labor income of the elderly increases, the marginal bene￿ts of
training intensity decreases. Thus, workers invest less in human capital. In response,
because productivity and thus labor income of older workers decrease, workers have
less incentives to continue working and reduce their retirement age.
Proposition 3.The PAYG system imposes an "total" tax µ(¿;p) > ¿ on training intensity
and an "total" tax £(¿;p) > ¸(¿;p) on retirement age, such that :
e(¿;p) = e
¤(1 ¡ µ(¿;p)) and z(¿;p) = z
¤(1 ¡ £(¿;p)) (8)
The impact of incentive schemes to work longer
We now introduce a policy aimed at eliminating the taxes imposed by the PAYG system. By
considering the situation of combining work with pension receipt : agents who work when old
receive the total bene￿ts due to them during the continuing working year. However, when
retired, workers will not receive any additional bene￿ts. Let s denotes the value of these
redistributed taxes. In this case, the total second period consumption becomes :
c2(s) = z[(1 ¡ ¿)wh2 + s] ¡ T + (1 ¡ z)p (9)




f1 ¡ [¸(¿;p;s) ¡ S]g (10)
where S = s
[1+e(¿;p;s)]wh1.
The PAYG system is actuarially fair at the margin, if and only if :
¸(¿;p;s) = S () s
¤(¿;p) = ¿wh2 + p (11)
This equation says that additional contributions by working another year and the foregone
pension due to this delayed retirement should be exactly equal to the incentive bene￿ts. In
the second period budgetary constraint of the worker, we then have :
c2(s
¤) = zw(1 + e)h1 ¡ T + p (12)
We verify that, at the margin, the individual decisions of e and z are not a￿ected by the
current system. More importantly, this reform does not lead to an increase of the social
security system de￿cits. Finally, it is also important to note that an actuarially fair reform
of the PAYG system has a double positive e￿ect because both employment and productivity
of older workers are increased.
43.2 The Firm’s Decisions
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From the ￿rm’s point of view, the ￿rst-order condition of the program (13) writes as :
(1 + e)yh1 = (1 + e)wh1 + fz (14)
The left-hand side stands for the marginal revenue generated by an additional year of pro-
duction and the right-hand side for the marginal costs of this year in terms of the wage
(1 + e)wh1 and the up-dating costs fz. In the laissez-faire setting, we deduce the following
separation date for the ￿rm :
z
¤ =
(y ¡ w)(1 + e¤)h1
f
(15)
The ￿rm’s optimal separation date positively depends on the worker’s productivity. This
suggest that low-skilled workers may be ￿red earlier because ￿rms refuse to employ them
for a long period. However, given equation (8), we obtain the following separation age in the
presence of the pension system :
z(¿;p) =
(y ¡ w)[1 + e¤(1 ¡ µ(¿;p))]h1
f
(16)
A crucial implication of this condition is that the ￿rm’s decision is also negatively a￿ected
by an actuarially unfair PAYG system. Indeed, because the tax on training intensity, µ(¿;p),
reduces the human capital investment, the worker’s productivity and thus the ￿rm’s pro￿ts
decrease in period 2. Hence, the production becomes less pro￿table, the ￿rm decides to
reduce the job duration in the second period.
Given the decrease in older workers’ productivity, subsidizing employment may be a
desirable option, especially if the worker’s skills acquired over his working life are not easily
transferable to other available jobs. In such policy option, ￿rms would be paid a fraction
¼ of the up-dating costs '(z) in order to compensate the low productivity of the retained
worker. In this case, the second period pro￿t of the ￿rm becomes :
¦2 = z(y ¡ w)f1 + e




Then, we deduce the following separation date :
z(¿;p;¼) =
(y ¡ w)[1 + e¤(1 ¡ µ(¿;p))]h1
(1 ¡ ¼)f
(18)
It is straightforward to verify that @z
@¼ > 0. Then, there exists a subsidy such that the




1 + e¤ (19)
5The value of the subsidy increase with the tax imposed by the PAYG on the training intensity.
In the absence of these distortions, µ(¿;p) = 0, the subsidy also equals zero.
4. General Equilibrium Analysis
There is an exogenous number of workers in the economy. Firms, which each employs one
worker, enter in the market until all individuals have a job. Then, each period, we have
2 £ N ￿rms. For the young worker, competitive equilibrium leads to ! = y. For the old
worker, walrasian adjustment of wages ensures the equilibrium between the retirement age
proposed by the worker and the one demanded by the ￿rm. This implies the existence of
an employment contract which ensures that separations at the end of life are mutually




° + (1 ¡ ¼)f(1 ¡ ¸ + S)
£ y (20)
The value °+f represents the total marginal cost of an additional year of work after the full
rate age for both the worker and the ￿rm. As ° represents the cost for the employee, in terms
of the disutility of working an additional year when ¼ = ¸ = S = 0, the output is divided
such that each agent receives a share which is proportional to his relative cost5. Equation
(20) also implies that an actuarially unfair PAYG system leads to an increase in the wage.
Therefore, on the one hand, for a given retirement age, social security taxes increase the
wage. On the other hand, for a given wage, they decrease the retirement age. Overall, the
global e￿ect of these taxes leads to a decrease in the retirement age and also the elderly’s
productivity.
There exists a set fS¸0;¼¸0g of incentives which allows the decentralized economy with
PAYG system to be e￿cient6. Indeed, if we introduce a labor supply incentives in which
the additional retirement bene￿ts are not adjusted in an actuarially fair way, S < ¸, the
employer should compensate the elderly only for the part of the retirement bene￿ts that
is not adjusted in an actuarially fair way. The lower the incentives S, the higher the net
tax (¸ ¡ S), the higher the wage, and hence the higher the subsidy. As a borderline case,
if the PAYG system is actuarially fair at the margin, which means that the total expected
social Security Surplus from the delayed retirement is completely redistributed as incentives
to workers, ¸ = S, such system does not distort the worker’s decisions and thus there is no
need to subsidy the ￿rm (¼ = 0).
But, overall, the existence of an optimal retirement age is the consequence of an op-
timal (￿exible) wage scheme which ensures that the worker-￿rm separation occurs at the
appropriate time. But one important issue remains : What happens if this assumption is
relaxed?
5We can see that if f = °, the production is equally divided between the worker and the ￿rm : w = 1
2 £y.
If f = 0 (there is no costs of updating the older worker jobs), the wage is equal to the marginal product of
a worker : w = y.
6These incentives are ￿nanced by the additional Social Security revenue (foregone pension and additional
contribution during the continuing working period) and the non-distortionary tax.
65. Unilateral Retirement Decision
We consider the consequences of introducing "one-party" retirement decision7. In this
context, the separation age can be "unilaterally" imposed by one party, thus the separation
date denoted zU is de￿ned as : zU = minfzW;zFg, where zW and zF denote the optimal
separation time for the worker and the ￿rm, respectively. Then the worker maximizes (3)
subject to zW · zF and, similarly, the ￿rm maximizes (13) subject to zF · zW. Two cases
arise :
1. First, if zU = zW(w < w¤) : the retirement age coincides with that of the worker.
Training intensity and retirement age are derived from (6) and (7), and actuarially fair
adjustments are particularly powerful to delay the retirement age. In contrast, subsidy
of up-dating costs does not work any more.
2. Second, if zU = zF, the problem for the worker is to choose his training intensity ~ e
subject to the constraint that he could not attain his optimal retirement age. This
constrained training intensity is :
~ e = ¯(1 ¡ ¿)wh1z
F (21)
The problem then for the ￿rm is now to choose zF subject to the constraint that ~ e is




(1 ¡ ¼)f ¡ (y ¡ w)(1 ¡ ¿)¯wh2
1
(22)
This equation shows that when we give to individuals only a fraction of the actuarially
fair incentives (such as an exemption from the tax contributions to the PAYG, i.e, ¿ =
0), the decentralized economy with PAYG system could be e￿cient without introducing
any subsidy. However, without Social Security provision reforms, subsidies should be
given to ￿rms in order to keep older workers in employment. When subsidies increase,
the ￿rm delays the retirement age. The incentives to delay z are twofold : ￿rst the
instantaneous pro￿t rises, and second the training intensity is higher. This ensures the
e￿ciency of this type of policy when employment-retirement transition is chosen by
the ￿rm.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper aims at studying the interaction between retirement decisions and human capital
formation by explicitly introducing the labor demand of the elderly in the presence of up-
dating costs on the older worker jobs. First, our approach reveals that an actuarially unfair
PAYG system negatively a￿ects both human capital investment and retirement decisions.
Second, it is found that the e￿ects of old-age policies strongly depend on the degree of wage
adjustment. Indeed, if wages are ￿exible, pension incentives or subsidy of up-dating costs
become substitutable and allow to delay the retirement age. In contrast, in the context of
wage rigidity, it can be e￿cient to give individuals only a fraction of the actuarially fair
incentives in case of postponed retirement.
7In this context, the retirement age is not subject to any speci￿c agreement between ￿rms and workers.
Another equivalent assumption is to consider that wages are rigid.
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